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Web-Assisted Suicide and the
First Amendment
by ELLEN LUU*

Introduction
Online social networking websites such as MySpace, l Facebook, 2 and
other newsgroups and message boards provide users with a unique way to

socialize. Users create profiles, post pictures, and contribute to web-based
discussions to maintain relationships.3 Newsgroup users form online
communities based particularly around certain topics where they can find
"a valuable source of information, support and friendship. ' ,A They share
not only political opinions and daily musings, but also very personal
For example, individuals suffering from
struggles and concerns.
depression may find a community message board where they can share
their feelings and find support. Unfortunately, these individuals may also
find community groups that trade detailed information on how to commit
suicide as well as provide psychological and emotional encouragement for
suicide.
* J.D. Candidate 2009, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 2005,
University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to express sincere thanks to my parents for
their endless love and support. My heartfelt appreciation also goes to Eric May for his
encouragement.
1. To view MySpace, visit http://www.myspace.com. See generally Brian Stelter, From
MySpace to YourSpace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/01/21/technology/21 myspace.html?_r =1 &st=cse&sq=myspace&scp =1 &orefrslogin
(indicating MySpace is the "world's largest social networking site," drawing over 1.3 billion
visits a day, more than any other website in the world).
2. To view Facebook, visit http://www.thefacebook.com.
3. See generally Wikipedia-MySpace, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MySpace (last visited
Nov. 15, 2008) ("MySpace is a popular social networking website offering an interactive, usersubmitted network of friends, personal profiles, blogs, groups, photos, music and videos for
teenagers and adults internationally."); Facebook- lnformation Page, http://www.facebook.
com/about.php (last visited Nov. 15, 2008) ("Millions of people use Facebook everyday to keep
up with friends, upload an unlimited number of photos, share links and videos, and learn more
about the people they meet.").
4. Wikipedia-Usenet Newsgroup, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Newsgroup.
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Consider the case of Suzanne Gonzales: She was a nineteen-year-old
student at the University of Florida who suffered from depression.5 She
found the Alt.Suicide.Holiday (ASH) newsgroup, 6 the most popular suicide
internet group 7 that works "like an online bulletin board.",8 It offers a
"practical user's guide to suicide. There's death by poison-everything
from antifreeze to heroin-death by asphyxiation, decapitation, immolation
and exsanguinations." 9 Gonzales posted one hundred messages in a period
of nine weeks, obtained information and instruction on how to pose as a
jeweler to obtain potassium cyanide and mix a lethal cocktail, and obtained
the assistance of other users to edit the suicide note to her parents.' 0
Also consider the case of a fifty-two-year-old woman who rented two
helium tanks and ended her life by overdosing on helium gas: l" The police
"found a printout from the Church of Euthanasia's website titled 'How to
Kill Yourself,' detailing the most effective way to use helium to end your
life.' 2 In another case, a twenty-one-year-old woman who suffered
depression was found hanging from a dog leash in the bathroom of her
home. 13 When her husband came home to find her, he also found the
computer still on, with a website on the computer screen detailing how to
commit suicide by hanging.' 4 While statistical information on how many
people in the United States have visited these websites and subsequently
committed suicide is limited, an estimated fifty-nine people in Japan in
January 2005 committed suicide after visiting similar websites. 15 In the

5. Julia Scheeres, A Virtual Path to Suicide, S.F. CHRON., June 8, 2003, at Al, availableat
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2003/06/08/MN 1 14902.DTL.
6. SR-71A, Where Has ASBS Gone?, http://www.ashbusstop.org.
7. Amelia Hill, The Suicide Club, THE OBSERVER, Apr. 27, 2003.
8. Thelma Gutierrez & Kim McCabe, Parents: Online Newsgroup Helped Daughter
Commit Suicide, CNN, Nov. I1, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/I 1/04/suicide.intemet/
index.html.
9.

Mary Braid, Suicide.corn: click here to end it all, THE INDEP., Mar. 5, 2001, availableat

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/suicidecom-click-here-to-endit-all-694607.html.
10.

Scheeres, supra note 5.
Rebecca Sinderbrand, Point, Click and Die, NEWSWEEK, June 30, 2003, available at
http://www.newsweek.com/id/59762.

11.

12. Id.
13. Id.
14.

Id.

15. lan Cobain, Suicide Websites: Clampdown on Chatrooms After Two Strangers Die in
First Internet Death Pact, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 11, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.

co.uk/uk/2005/oct/I l/socialcare.technology.
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United Kingdom, these websites have been implicated in the deaths of at
least sixteen young people in the years leading to 2006.16
In response to Suzanne Gonzales's tragic suicide, Representative
Walter Herger of California introduced H.R. 940: Suzanne Gonzales
Suicide Prevention Act of 2007.17 The bill proposes to amend title 18 of
the United States Code to federally criminalize those who use interstate
commerce for suicide promotion.' 8 It punishes the knowing use of
interstate commerce with intent "to teach a particular person how to
commit suicide, knowing that the person so taught is likely to use that
teaching to commit suicide" or with the intent "to provide a particular
person with material support or resources to help such person commit
suicide, knowing that the person is likely to use the support to commit
suicide."' 19 The amendment would cover "supplying information... to a
particular person who the provider knows is contemplating suicide," or
providing "any property, tangible or intangible, or service that is
reasonably capable of substantially assisting a person to commit suicide,
with the intent of making that person's suicide attempt easier to
accomplish. 2 °
This Note discusses whether statutes that prohibit usage of the internet
to actively and directly encourage a particular person to commit suicide or
to provide general suicide-promoting information violate the First
Amendment. Justice Stevens has recognized that the Court has "not yet
considered whether, and if so to what extent, the First Amendment
protects" speech that instructs people on how to commit crimes. 21 While it
may be easy to argue that suicide-promoting cyber-speech is really just
conduct-assisted suicide, such a determination fails to take into account the
legitimate speech-related purpose. The Supreme Court has upheld the
prohibition of assisted suicide, 22 but has not addressed cyber-speech that
promotes or encourages suicide. It may similarly be easy to argue that
cyber-speech that promotes suicide clearly falls within one of the
16. Jonathan Owen, Teens Die After Logging Into "Suicide Chat Rooms, " THE INDEP., Sept.
10, 2006, availableat http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/teens-die-after-logginginto-suicide-chat-rooms-415386.html.
17. Suzanne Gonzales Suicide Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 940, l 10th Cong. (2007),
available at www.govtrack.us/congresslbill.xpd?bill=h 110-940 (as of Sept. 26, 2008, this bill has
not made it out of Committee.).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Eugene Volokh, Crime-FacilitatingSpeech, 57 STAN L. REV. 1095, 1128-32 (2005)
(citing Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari in Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995
(2002)).
22. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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unprotected categories of speech. This argument, however, similarly fails
because such speech does not in fact fall squarely within the existing
categories of unprotected speech. Finally, as content-based regulations, a
court analyzing the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting such speech
must employ the strict scrutiny test.
Should cyber-speech promoting suicide be afforded First Amendment
protection? Would criminalization arise when an individual simply posts
instructions on the best way to commit suicide by hanging? Or, would it
only arise when an individual provides such information to another whom
that individual knows is seeking such information and is likely to use it to
commit suicide? Section I of this Note presents and applies the traditional
First Amendment jurisprudence to cyber-speech promoting suicide.
Section II presents an overview of the Supreme Court's discussion of
speech and the internet. Section III introduces the constitutionality of
existing federal statutes that criminalize cyber-stalking. This analysis is
useful because it shows how crime-facilitating cyber-speech squares with
the First Amendment. Also, since the criminalization of cyber-stalking is a
recent development, the analysis provides insight into how the use of
cyber-speech to promote suicide may stand against a First Amendment
challenge. Finally, Section IV uses cyber-stalking statutes as guidance for
drafting statutes that prohibit the use of cyber-speech to promote suicide.
I. Traditional First Amendment Jurisprudence and
Cyber-Speech That Promotes Suicide-an Imperfect Fit
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. 2 3 Implicit in the
First Amendment is the right to information and ideas,24 as well as the
"right to receive it."'25 It does not apply merely to political speech, but also
to speech that is "entertaining as well as . . . instructive or informative. 26
The founder of ASH, Andrew Beals, 27 argues that the "purpose of the site
is rational, open discussion about suicide, with emphasis on individual
liberty and autonomy., 28 He asserts that the website serves as an open
23.
24.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Bd. ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (citing Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141,

143 (1943)).
25. Id. (citing Struthers, 319 U.S. at 143) ("[T]he right to receive ideas is a necessary
predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political
freedom.").
26. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw § 497 (2008).
27. Scheeres, supra note 5.
28. Rebecca Sinderbrand, Q&A: "Groups Like Ours Will Always Exist," NEWSWEEK, June

24, 2003, availableat http://www.newsweek.com/id/58538?tid=relatedcl.

Winter 20091

WEB-ASSISTED SUICIDE

forum for people who share similar emotional pain and serves as one of the
few places where they can find support, acceptance, and understanding. 9
Individuals who use the newsgroup find it easier to discuss depression or
suicidal thoughts online than in person, and these newsgroups provide a
place where they can speak without alarming friends and family or face
hospitalization. 30 In light of claims that such cyber-speech has a legitimate
purpose, are advertisements for suicide partners, feedback on self-murder31
plans, and guides on how to commit suicide in the "methods file"
protected speech in the face of challenges to legislation that criminalizes
such speech?
First Amendment rights are not absolute. There are "well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which" does not violate the First Amendment. 32 These unprotected,
content-based categories of speech include incitement, "true threats,"
fighting words, and "obscenity., 33 Legislation addressing these issues34must
meet the strict scrutiny standard to survive a constitutional challenge.
A.

Existing Categories of Unprotected Speech
The development of modem First-Amendment jurisprudence began in
the early 1900s and historically arose in the context of political speech
during wartime. In Schenck v. United States, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes first employed the "clear and present danger" test for a violation of
the Espionage Act of 1917.35 The defendant participated in the print and
mail distribution of leaflets calling for obstruction of the draft.36 The test is
"whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. 3" Whether speech
falls within this category is a question of "imminence and the magnitude of

29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
33. See infra Section I.A. Other types of unprotected speech not discussed here include
libel, defamation, and false advertising.
34. See infra notes 150-167 and accompanying text.
35. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding the Espionage Act was a valid
Congressional enactment and the conviction of the defendants did not violate the First
Amendment).
36. Id. at 48-53.

37. Id. at 52.
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the danger" stemming from the speech, which the Court must balance
against the expressiveness of the speech. 38
1.

Incitement and Fighting Words
Fifty years after Schenck, the "clear and present danger" test was
eventually replaced with the test for "incitement" from Brandenberg v.
Ohio. The defendant in Brandenberg was charged with violating a
criminal syndicalism statute for his speech at a Ku Klux Klan rally. 39 The
speech included statements such as "Bury the niggers," and "Send the Jews
back to Israel. 4 0 Justice Douglas wrote a compelling concurring opinion
in which he questioned the use of the "clear and present danger" test in
times of war and most certainly in times of peace.4' In fact, Justice
Douglas pointed out, in subsequent court opinions, that Justice Holmes
intended a narrow use of the "clear and present danger" rule and rejected
manipulating the rule to prohibit otherwise permissible speech.4 2
Moreover, he criticized the overly flexible and inconsistent manner in
which the test can be applied to prohibit speech.4 3
Under the new Brandenberg test, speech "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and ... likely to incite or produce such
action" is not protected by the First Amendment.4 4 The government may
not, however, prohibit speech merely because "it increases the chance an
unlawful act will be committed at some indefinite future time. ' ' 4 5 A statute
that punishes mere advocacy, even for lawless activity, is too broad to pass
constitutional muster.4 6
Within the unprotected category of incitement is the small class of
expressive conduct known as "fighting words., 47 In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, the Supreme Court ruled that states are free to ban the use of
"fighting words" which inherently would incite an ordinary citizen to
38. 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law, supra note 26, § 493 (citing Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978)).
39. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 444-47 (1969).
40. Id. at 446.
41. Id. at 450-52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 450-52, 457; see Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 482-84 (1920) (Holmes,

J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239, 253-73 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43. Brandenberg,395 U.S. at 450-52 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 444-45, 447 (majority opinion) (holding that a statute that prohibits "advocating
the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of terrorism"
unconstitutionally prohibits mere advocacy).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 448.
47.

16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 26, § 503.
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whom the words are addressed to immediate physical retaliation. 48 The
Court found a statute that prohibits the use of "offensive, derisive, or
annoying word[s] to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other
public place" to be a valid exercise of state power and neither vague nor
overbroad.4 9 It is narrowly drawn to prohibit specific speech that is likely
to cause a breach of the peace. 50 The Court carefully distinguished these
"fighting words" as verbal acts that have very low social value.5 ' Such
speech is not an "essential part of any exposition of ideas, and is of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived52
from it is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.,
When analyzing the validity of statutes that prohibit suicide-promoting
cyber-speech or the need to develop a new category of unprotected speech,
weighing the social value of speech is a factor to consider.53
To determine whether speech falls within the "incitement" category,
the courts must carefully examine the actual circumstances of the situation
and determine whether it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action., 54 In Cohen v.
California, the defendant was charged with violating the penal code for
wearing a jacket that bore the words "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse.5 5
The Court struck down the provision of the penal code which prohibits
"maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any
neighborhood or person... by offensive conduct., 56 The use of
"offensive" as a test for "incitement" was too broad to pass constitutional
muster under Brandenberg.57 While the speech addressed in Cohen also
constituted "fighting words" in the sense that the words may have provoked
a violent reaction from viewers, the speech was not directed at any
individual in particular, a requirement of the Chaplinsky test. 58 The Court
also addressed and rejected the "captive audience" argument that the
government can prohibit speech merely because of the "presumed presence
48. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
49. Id. at 569, 573-74.
50. Id. at 573.
51. Id. at 572-74.
52. Id. at 572.
53. See infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; infra notes 160-162 and accompanying
text (discussion about "dual-use distinction").
54. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 26, § 502 (citing Knight Riders of Ku
Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1995)).
55. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 22-24.
58. Id. at 20.
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of unwitting listeners or viewers., 59 In fact, the government's power to
protect the public from such speech is "dependent upon a showing that
substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner." 60 The Court found no such "captive audience" as people could
easily avert their eyes. 61 The "captive audience" issue will be
addressed in
6
2
U.
CL
A
v.
Reno
of
discussion
Note's
this
during
detail
greater
The narrow category of "fighting words" presents an analytical
problem for cyber-speech that promotes suicide.
As discussed in
Chaplinsky, the "fighting words" must elicit an immediate physical
reaction. 63 As elaborated in Cohen, the speech must be directed at a
particular individual.64 Many users of these online community groups do
not have such an immediate reaction against the speaker due to the nature
of the internet and how it is used. General documents describing methods
for committing suicide that are posted on suicide-promoting websites
present information and are not directed at anyone in particular. In
situations where users directly post responses to questions about various
suicide methods, the "fighting words" test also fails to render the speech
unprotected because such words, while they may elicit a reaction-such as
suicide-they do not elicit a physical retaliation against the speaker, as
intended by the "fighting words" category of unprotected speech.
The broader "incitement" category of unprotected speech seems the
most applicable to cyber-speech for suicide promotion, but still presents a
difficult hurdle. For example, the "incitement" test would not apply to
users who participate in the promotion of suicide by posting general
instructions on methods. This speech does not produce "imminent" action
and can easily be characterized as mere advocacy. There is a difference,
however, between posting general information and responding to a request
for information as assistance to the commission of suicide. This distinction
will be further discussed in Section IV of this Note.
2.

Obscenity
The Supreme Court has also determined that "obscenity" does not fall
within First Amendment protection.65 The test for "obscenity" is whether

59. Id. at 21.
60. Id.
61.

Id. at21-22.

62. See infra notes 93-117 and accompanying text.
63. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
64. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971).
65.

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (upholding a statute that punishes the

mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious or filthy... materials").
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the speech at issue "deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient
interest '66 as judged by "a reasonable person, 67 whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law, and whether the work, "taken as 68a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.,
Cyber-speech that promotes suicide does not "deal with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interest" and similarly would not fall under this
category of unprotected speech. In contrast, cyber-stalking speech often
deals with sexual conduct. 69
Analysis of cyber-stalking speech as
"obscenity" in Section III of this Note provides insight into how future
courts may evaluate cyber-speech that promotes suicide, use existing First
Amendment jurisprudence, and develop new frameworks for analysis.
3.

True Threats
Finally, "true threats" to a person's safety made by another person are
not protected by the First Amendment.7 ° In Watts v. United States, the
defendant was charged with violating a statute which punishes "whoever
knowingly and willfully... threat[ens] to take the life of or to inflict bodily
harm upon the President of the United States. 7
At a political rally, he
said, "If [the army] ever make[s] me carry a rifle[,] the first man I want to
get in my sights is [Lyndon B. Johnson]."7 2 Following the statement, both
he and the audience laughed in response.73 Taking these factors into
consideration, the Court held that he had not made a "true threat" and the
statute unconstitutionally criminalized pure speech.74 The government may
only prohibit "true threats" and the statement made by the defendant
constituted a "political hyperbole" meant to express political opposition to
the draft.75 "True threats" are "serious expression[s] of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals, regardless of whether the speaker intends to carry out the

66. Id.
at 488-90.
67. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500-01 (1987).
68. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
69. See infra note 142.
70. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705-07 (1969); see also R.A.V.v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
71. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 706-07.
74. Id. at 706-08.
75. Id.

316
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threat." 76 They are not constitutionally protected because such speech is
used to intimidate or place the victim in fear of physical harm or death.77
Like the category of "obscenity," the category of "true threats" would
not apply to cyber-speech that promotes suicide. Users may offer
information and instruction about committing suicide but the users do not
threaten to cause harm themselves. The application of the "true threats"
framework to cyber-stalking statutes, however, similarly provides
guidelines for drafting statutes to prohibit cyber-speech that promotes
suicide.78
B.

A Call For a New Category of Unprotected Speech?
Perhaps the Supreme Court must determine that cyber-speech which
promotes suicide has virtually no constitutional value, creating a new First
Amendment exception. One preeminent scholar, Eugene Volokh, has
introduced a test to determine whether speech that substantially facilitates
crimes should be a First Amendment exception. 79 This test requires that
three conditions are satisfied: (1) "the speech is said to a few people who
the speaker knows are likely to use it to commit a crime or to escape
punishment," (2) "the speech, even though broadly published, has virtually
no noncriminal uses-for instance, when it reveals social security numbers
or computer passwords," and (3) "the speech facilitates extraordinarily
serious harms, such as nuclear or biological attacks. 8 °
Under this framework, general discussion about suicide methods
posted by an individual or speech about how to cope with depression may
not fall under this proposed crime-facilitating exception. It is not directed
at any particular person likely to use it to commit suicide, but is instead
general information published broadly. It arguably has non-criminal
purposes as the ASH founder and users of such websites allege. 8I Online
communities based particularly around certain topics find the websites to
be "a valuable source of information, support and friendship. 8 2 Users of
these suicide-promoting websites post information and have discussions
that do not serve a criminal purpose. With regards to the third condition, it
is arguable that suicide does not compare to nuclear or biological attacks, in

76. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (upholding a statute that prohibits
burning a cross with the intent to intimidate a person or group of persons).
77. Id. at 359-60.
78. See infra Sections III and IV.
79. See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1107-27.
80. See id.
81. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
82. Wikipedia-Usenet Newsgroup, supra note 4.
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scope nor level of criminality. Attempted and assisted suicide has
traditionally only been criminalized or banned as a non-felonious offense,
and there is no fundamental right to assisted suicide.83
This framework, however, could apply to situations where individuals
post information about suicide methods in direct response to explicit or
implicit requests for such information. The speech is directed at particular
individuals who may be likely to use the information to commit suicide.
The speech has no non-criminal purpose once it is directed at an individual
who is seriously considering suicide with the intent that the individual
commits suicide. However, as discussed above, the third condition poses a
hurdle which may be difficult to overcome.
II. Adapting First Amendment Jurisprudence to the Internet
It is important to consider the nature and characteristics of a medium84
of communication when conducting First Amendment analysis.
Consider, for example, the different approaches taken with print versus
broadcast media. Radio broadcast is distinguishable from print media
because of the scarcity of radio frequencies. 85 The Supreme Court struck
down a statute requiring newspapers that print an attack on a political
candidate's character to print the candidate's reply.86 With regards to
broadcast, the Supreme Court upheld the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) "fairness doctrine" that requires television and radio
broadcasters to provide fair coverage to each side of a discussion on public
issues.87 Also take, for example, the differing analysis for the regulation of
"indecent" speech. In FCCv. Pacifica Foundation,the Court held the FCC
has the power to regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent, though not
obscene.88 Regulation is justified due to the fact that broadcasting is
"uniquely pervasive" in a manner in which it intrudes into homes without

83. See infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text; see generally Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding assisted suicide is not a fundamental right protected by
the due process clause and that Washington's ban on assisted suicide was rationally related to a
legitimate government interest).
84. Red Lion Broad., Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969); see also Se. Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
85. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396-98.
86. Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 244, 258 (1974) ("The choice of...
treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair-constitute the exercise of
editorial control andjudgment. It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process can be exercised consistent with [the] First Amendment.").
87. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 375.
88.

FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978).
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warning as to content. 89 A statute that prohibits indecent telephone
messages, however, was found unconstitutional.9" The Court distinguishes
between telephone and broadcast because telephone messages "requires the
listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication. There is no
'captive audience' problem." 9 Radio broadcast lends itself to "unexpected
outburst[s]" but an indecent telephone message is "not so invasive or
surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to
it,,92

Despite the fact that the nature and characteristics of the internet make
it a medium of communication unlike more traditional mediums of
communication such as print and broadcast, the Supreme Court seems to be
analyzing free speech issues under the traditional frameworks set forth in
the previous Section I of this Note. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court struck
down the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) as
unconstitutional.93 The CDA prohibits the transmission of obscene or
indecent communications by means of telecommunications devices to
minors.94 The Court specifically discussed three prior decisions in finding
the CDA overbroad and an unconstitutional, content-based regulation:
Ginsberg v. New York, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, and Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc. 95 It compared the internet to broadcast media,
distinguishing it on three factors: (1) "the history of extensive
Government... regulation of the broadcast medium"; (2) "the scarcity of
available frequencies at its inception"; and (3) the invasiveness of the
broadcast medium. 96 The97 Court ultimately found that these factors are not
present with the internet.
Justice Stevens distinguished the CDA from the constitutionally
upheld New York statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to
minors for four reasons in Ginsburg v. New York. 98 First, the New York
89. Id. at 748-49.
90. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) (holding Section

223(b) of the Communications Act prohibiting obscene speech constitutional because the First
Amendment does not protect this category of speech. However, Section 223(b)'s ban on indecent
speech violates the First Amendment because this provision is not narrowly tailored to serve the

compelling interest of limiting access to minors of sexually-oriented commercial telephone
messages, also known as dial-a-pom).

91. Id. at 127-28.
92. Id.
93. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at

859.
865.
868.
868-69.
865.
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statute does not bar parents from purchasing the materials for their
children. 99
Second, the New York statute applies to commercial
00
transactions.1 Third, the New York statute provides a standard for the
vague term "indecent."' 10 1 And finally, the New York statute defines
minors as those under the age of seventeen.10 2 In contrast, the CDA is
much broader: it allows criminal penalties against parents, applies to all
transmissions by telecommunications
devices, fails to define "indecent,"
10 3
and includes seventeen year olds.
The FCC regulation against indecent speech broadcast over the air in
Pacifica is also distinguishable from the CDA. 10 4 In Pacifica, the Court
upheld an FCC order for administrative sanctions against a radio station for
broadcast of a satiric monologue called "Filthy Words" because it involved
"obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communications."'105
First, the FCC, an experienced agency, was
regulating content in terms of time.10 6 Second, the FCC regulation did not
involve criminal prosecution. 107 Third, the FCC regulation applied to a
medium of communication in which historically, warnings have
ineffectively protected listeners from unexpected content. 0 8 In contrast,
the CDA broadly bans content absent evaluation by a regulatory body
familiar with the nature of the internet; the CDA involves criminal
prosecution; and, the CDA involves a communication medium-the
internet-that does not
have the same "captive audience" problem that
09
broadcast.
with
exists
The Court's decision to uphold a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult
movie theaters in residential neighborhoods in Renton v. Playtime Theatres,
Inc. also does not support upholding the CDA. 110 The zoning ordinance
was directed at regulating the secondary effects of crime and decreasing
property value."1 In contrast, the CDA regulates the primary effect of the

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 865-66.
Id. at 866.
Id. at 867.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1978).
Reno, 521 U.S. at 867.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
at 867-68.
Id.
at 867.
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speech." 2 The CDA is thus a content-based regulation, while the FCC3
order is a permissible regulation on time, place, and manner of speech."
Justice Stevens expressed particular concern about the vagueness, over
breadth, and
criminal sanctions of the CDA as a content-based
14
regulation.'
When presented with the unique characteristics of the internet, the
Supreme Court had to determine what level of First Amendment protection
to give this new medium since it did not have case law precedent." 5 To
summarize, in analyzing speech and the internet, the Court is concerned
with content-based regulations that are overbroad, vague, and involve
possible criminal sanctions." 6 When the content of both protected
(indecent) and unprotected (obscene) speech is regulated as to time in the
context of a medium that has no historical difficulty in preventing access to
unexpected material, the Court prefers deference to and evaluation by an
experienced agency.' '7
III. The Changing Nature of the Internet and the Problem of

Cyber-Stalking
Since Reno, internet use has increased dramatically and new concerns
have arisen." 8 The legislature has responded to the advancements in
technology that have created new crimes such as cyber-stalking and cyberharassment.' '9 The Department of Justice has defined cyber-stalking as the
"use of the Internet, e-mail, or other electronic communications devices to
stalk another person."'120 Cyber-stalking can pose a greater danger than
offline stalking due to "the ease of use and non-confrontational,
impersonal, and sometimes anonymous nature of Internet communications
[which] may remove disincentives to cyberstalking."' 2' This relatively new

112. Id. at 868.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 871-72, 877-78.
115. Id. at 870.
116. Id. at 868-69, 871-72, 877-78.
117. Id.at 867.
118. Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service SectorInternational Telecommunication Union, http://www.itu.int/ITUD/ict/statistics/at-glance/KeyTele
com99.html. The statistics indicate that from 1997 to 2006, the total number of internet users in
the world increased from 117 million to 1.168 billion. Id.
119.

See infra notes 129-135 and accompanying text.

120.

1999

REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

INDUSTRY (Attorney General of the United States ed. 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm.
121.

Id.
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crime drastically bridges the distance barrier and now enables stalking to
occur from across the country, allows for the ease of online stalking with
the click of a button, 2 2 and allows the stalker to hide behind a "veil of
anonymity."'' 23 These factors made it difficult to address the problem of
cyber-stalking. If a stalker was located in a different city or state than the
victim, it was difficult to investigate and prosecute the stalker.1 24 A stalker
can also create an email address, which many service providers allow
without proper authentication as to identity, from which to send harassing
and stalking messages.1 25 The ease and anonymity of sending emails
cyber-stalkers
makes it difficult for victims and law enforcement to identify
26
internet.1
the
over
communicate
who
and cyber-harassers
Cyber-stalking involves a wide range of conduct that cannot be easily
or accurately drafted into anti-cyber-stalking legislation. While such
legislation must be broad to effectively cover this wide range of conduct,
over breadth presents First Amendment problems. Cyber-stalking involves
expressive conduct and speech over the internet. It implicates the
1 27
and, in particular, the category of
unprotected category of "obscenity,"
28
"true threats" discussed in Watts.
Overview of Existing Cyber-Stalking Legislation
The examination of federal legislation to address cyber-stalking and
cyber-harassment provides insight into how to draft statutes to criminalize
the similar problem of cyber-speech that promotes suicide. The Interstate
Communications Act prohibits the transmission in interstate commerce of
"any communication containing.., any threat to injure the person of
across state lines via the
another."'129 This includes threats transmitted
1 30
telephone, email, beepers, or the Internet.
Section 113 of the Violence Against Women and Department of
Justice Reauthorization Act (Violence Against Women Act) amended the
Communications Act of 1934, originally applicable to telephone
A.

122.

Id.
123. Id.; see also Amy C. Radosevich, Note, Thwarting the Stalker: Are Anti-Stalking
Measures Keeping Pace with Today's Stalker?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1371, 1387 (2000).
124.

1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

INDUSTRY, supra note 120.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
See supra discussion in Section 1.

128.

See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text; Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,

705-06 (1969).
129. Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
130. Id.
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communication, to apply to the Internet.' 3' It prohibits the knowing and
anonymous use of a "telecommunications device" "to annoy, abuse,
threaten, or harass" a person. 132 This includes "any device or software that
can be used to originate telecommunications or other types of
communications
that are transmitted, in whole or in part, by the
133
Internet."'
Finally, the Violence Against Women Act also amended the Federal
Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act to address cyberstalking.134 The statute punishes those who, "with the intent to kill, injure,
[or] harass," uses "mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of
interstate or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes
substantial emotional distress ... [or] reasonable
fear of the death of, or
35
serious bodily injury" to another person.
B. How Existing Anti-Cyber-Stalking Legislation Stands Up Against the
First Amendment
Legislation that address cyber-stalking have passed constitutional
muster despite their seeming over breadth for a number of reasons. First of
all, a "true threat" under the Interstate Communications Act must be such
that a reasonable person "(1) would take the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm (the mens rea), and (2)
would perceive such expression as being communicated to effect some
change or achieve some goal through intimidation (the actus rea).' 3 6 This
is an objective standard, dependent on whether the recipient of the
communication would reasonably perceive the communication to be a
serious expression of an intent to cause bodily harm. 137 The statute
punishes the knowing and willful threat of bodily injury through the use of
131. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-162, § 113, 119 Stat. 2960, 2987 (2006).
132. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2008).
133. Id. § 223(h)(1)(C).
134. Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006),
amended by Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005,
119 Stat. 2960, 2987-88 (2006).
135. Id.
136. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding a reasonable
person would not perceive an email and fictional stories posted to a newsgroup depicting the
"abduction, rape, torture, mutilation, and murder of women and young girls," including one about
"a young woman who shared the name of one of [his] classmates at the University of Michigan,"
to constitute "serious expressions of an intention to inflict bodily harm... [or] to effect some
change or achieve some goal through intimidation" to that woman. The Court employed an
objective standard); see also United States v. Stewart, 411 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 2005).
137. Stewart, 411 F.3d at 828.
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interstate commerce. 138 Cyber-stalking involves categories of unprotected
As
speech-most often "true threats" and occasionally "obscenity."
discussed in Section I of this Note, cyber-speech does not 39fall as easily into
the traditional exceptions to First Amendment protection.
Second, when analyzing whether communication of the threat
occurred, courts do not focus on whether the chosen mode of
communication reached an "indefinite and unknown audience," but
whether the individual intended to communicate the threat to the recipient
through the means. 140 In other words, the Interstate Communications Act
punishes communicating threats regardless of the range of dissemination.
Section (a)(1)(C) of the Interstate Communications Act prohibits the use of
a telecommunications device to anonymously "annoy, abuse, threaten, or
harass any person ... who receives the communication."' 4 1 It similarly
employs a requirement that the speech be addressed or intended for a
specific recipient, regardless of the mode of telecommunication used.
The statute also overcomes First Amendment scrutiny by not
impinging on constitutionally protected speech. The statute, in provisions
other than section (a)(1)(C), prohibits the use of telecommunications
devices to knowingly make "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communications which is obscene or child pornography,
knowing that the recipient... is under 18 years of age."' 142 It also prohibits
knowingly making "any obscene communication for commercial purposes"
through the interstate use of telephones. 43 Obscene 44speech, as discussed in
Miller, is not afforded First Amendment protection.

138. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022
(1976); see also United States v. DeAndino, 958 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 505 U.S.
1206 (1992); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1097
(1995).
139. See supra discussion in Section 1.
140. Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1023 (At a Jewish Defense League press conference following a
session of the United Nations General Assembly at which Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, was to speak, Kelner was interviewed by a reporter and indicated he
would assassinate Arafat. The interview was broadcast on television and Kelner was charged
with violating the Interstate Communications Act. The court held that speech that was "so
unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to person threatened that it conveyed
gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution" was not afforded First Amendment
protection.).
141. Interstate Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2006).
142. Id.; see also Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
143. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2008).
144.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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IV. What to Consider When Drafting Legislation That Prohibits
Suicide-Promoting Cyber-Speech
While cyber-stalking statutes provide a starting place for analysis of
suicide-promoting cyber-speech, they fall short of providing a solid
foundation for such analysis.
Cyber-stalking statutes criminalize
unprotected speech-either "true threats" or "obscenity." But, as discussed
in Section I of this Note, cyber-speech that promotes suicide does not fall
neatly within these unprotected categories of speech.145
General
information on different methods to commit suicide posted on the website
may be protected speech. It is not obscene and does not constitute
"fighting words" or incitement of immediate lawless action. In contrast, a
web-post that directly responds to an individual's request for information
on a specific method leads to a different conclusion. This speech may in
fact be "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is
' 46
likely to incite or produce such action."'
Consider the following scenario: Person A joins a newsgroup that
provides information on suicide. Person A converses with Person B over
the course of two months and Person A conveys serious signs of
depression. The relationship progresses into discussions about suicide.
Then, one day, Person A requests information about death by poison.
Person B provides encouragement and detailed information about various
methods, and, the following day, Person A commits suicide. The
encouraging words and information would likely qualify as inciting
suicide, a non-felonious offense. Person B was arguably aware that his
speech would produce such action, and under a federal statute prohibiting
the use of interstate commerce (e.g., the internet) to promote or directly
encourage suicide, Person B may be found guilty.
This discussion inevitably leads to strict scrutiny analysis. Contentbased regulations of speech are "presumptively invalid under the First
Amendment."1 47
The government may "regulate the content of
constitutionally protected speech" if the regulation is "narrowly tailored" to
a "compelling government interest."1 48 Under these factors, then, we must
first consider whether the government would have a "compelling interest"
in the above hypothetical.
"The government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
145. See supra discussion in Section 1.
146. 16A AM. JUR. 2D ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 26, § 502 (citing Knight Riders of Ku
Klux Klan v. City of Cincinnati, 72 F.3d 43 (6th Cir. 1995)).
147. Id. § 458 (2008) (citing Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, Nos. 05-1589 and 051657, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 7722 (Jun. 14, 2007)).
148. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
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149
or disagreeable[,]" so bad ideas alone are not a compelling interest.
Therefore, while society may find cyber-speech that promotes suicide to be
offensive or disagreeable, this would not be enough to satisfy the
"compelling state interest" prong. However, while the bad idea alone may
not be enough, a compelling interest may be based on the very issue at
hand-suicide.

A. The Preservation of Life as a Compelling Interest
There is a compelling interest in the preservation of life. Attempted
and assisted suicide has traditionally been criminalized or banned as a nonfelonious offense. 50 In Washington v. Glucksberg, after finding no
fundamental right to "physician-assisted suicide ,151 the Court found a
statute that criminalizes a person who "knowingly causes or aids another
person to attempt suicide" to be constitutional. The state has a legitimate
interest in the preservation of human life, preventing suicide, maintaining
the integrity and ethics of medical profession, and protecting vulnerable
persons who might be pressured. 5 2 Because such statutes do not impinge
on any fundamental rights, they are subject only to rational basis judicial
scrutiny. The most notable assisted suicide cases, however, are related to
physician-assisted suicide.1 53 The question then becomes whether these
government interests satisfy the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny
in the context of content-based restrictions of cyber-speech that promotes
suicide.
Perhaps the ease with which web-assisted suicide can occur justifies
the determination that there is a compelling interest. Cyber-speech
promoting suicide (1) is instantaneous, (2) provides for wide dissemination,
(3) bridges distance, and (4) provides for anonymity-factors that make
cyber-stalking dangerous and which provide important considerations for
the drafting of cyber-stalking statutes.154 Individuals can send information
and instructions on how to commit suicide through e-mail, chat rooms, and
instant messaging nearly instantaneously. With the use of websites, chat
rooms, and community boards, individuals can distribute information and
instructions on how to commit suicide to a wide group of particularly
149. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118 (1991) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)).
150. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding assisted suicide is not a
fundamental right protected by the due process clause and that Washington's ban on assisted
suicide was rationally related to a legitimate government interest).
151.
152.
153.

Id.at 728.
Id.at 731-32.
Id. at 728; see also Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 796-97 (1997).

154. Seesupra notes 118-126.
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vulnerable individuals. These individuals may suffer from depression or
suicidal thoughts and may not want to speak to friends, family, or
psychologists. Instead, they can interact with people from all over the
world who are willing to discuss and instruct on how to commit suicide.
The online social networks are particularly compelling due to the public's
discomfort with suicide. Many do not discuss or openly encourage suicide
so the topic is shrouded with secrecy and stigma. However, on the internet,
individuals can overcome hesitation or unwillingness and provide
information and instruction under the "veil of anonymity.'' 5' Anonymity
also allows individuals to monitor the activities of vulnerable users. They
can watch the emotional and psychological progress of an individual and
provide encouragement and instruction for committing suicide when that
individual is most vulnerable. In an even more frightening scenario,
individuals can adopt methods used in cyber-stalking to encourage suicide.
For example, an elicitor can recruit a third party to anonymously provide
information and encouragement to a person the elicitor knows is
contemplating suicide.
B. Narrow Tailoring
To satisfy the second, narrow tailoring prong, the court looks to a
number of factors. First, the statute must advance the government
interest.156 Second, it must not be over-inclusive to prohibit speech which
does not implicate the government interest. 57 Third, it must be the least
restrictive measure that serves the government interest.158 Finally, underinclusiveness is also a concern. 59 Under-inclusiveness is suspect because
it suggests that the stated government interest may actually be a pretext for
favoring one form of speech deemed acceptable over another form deemed
offensive or disfavored.
Does this mean that statutes designed to prohibit cyber-speech without
violating the First Amendment are merely drafting exercises where the goal
is to mirror cyber-stalking statutes? Eugene Volokh, mentioned above,
suggests that crime-facilitating speech is a form of "dual-use material"
which can be used in both harmful and legitimate ways.' 60 These websites
155.

1999 REPORT ON CYBERSTALKING: A NEW CHALLENGE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND

INDUSTRY, supra note 120.
156. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256 (1986); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1,45-47, 53 (1976).
157. FEC v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985).
158. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
159. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (analyzing strict
scrutiny in a race classification context).
160. Volokh, supra note 21, at 1107-27.
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may be used in harmful ways by providing instructions on how to commit
suicide to particularly vulnerable people. They may also be used in
legitimate ways by helping people "evaluate and participate in public
discourse" 1 61' ' 62and by providing others a "valuable ...means of expressing
their views.

The focus of cyber-stalking statutes is on the speech instilling fear of
bodily harm or death. There is clearly a harmful use and virtually no
legitimate purpose behind cyber-stalking. The Sixth Circuit has said that
the Federal Interstate Stalking Punishment and Prevention Act which
prohibits intentionally "using the internet in a course of conduct that places
a person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury" cannot be
seen as overbroad to impinge on constitutionally protected conduct.1 63 This
law, along with the section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934,64
applies to conduct that does not warrant First Amendment protection.'
Cyber-stalking is "intended to instill fear in the victim," not to invoke
constitutionally protected political speech.1 65 But, websites such as ASH
purport to provide a place for open discussion and a place where users can
find support and understanding.1 66 So, while the harmful use is to
encourage vulnerable people to commit suicide, there may be a legitimate
use.
Volokh proposes that "[u]nder this approach, the dual-use speech
[could not] be banned when such a ban would interfere with the valuable
uses, even when the ban was needed to prevent the harmful uses." 67 The
drafting concerns would thus be less problematic and more likely to satisfy
the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny if the statute focuses explicitly
on (1) intentionally and knowingly providing information and methods for
committing suicide, (2) through the use of interstate commerce, (3) to a
specific recipient, (4) who has implicitly or explicitly indicated a desire for
such information, (5) with the intent and knowledge that the recipient use
that information to commit suicide. In other words, regulations that
explicitly focus on prohibiting the harmful uses of such cyber-speech are
valid. But those that interfere with valuable uses-such as discussing
depression and suicide for therapeutic purposes and the need for a sense of
community and understanding-are invalid.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 1114-15.
Id. at 1107-27.
United States v. Bowker, 372 F.3d 365, 378-79 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 379; see also Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(C) (2008).

165. Bowker, 372 F.3d at 379.
166. Sinderbrand, supra note 28.
167. Volokh, supra note 21, at 1133.
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Conclusion
Cyber-speech used to provide information about suicide and to
promote suicide is a new concern that has arisen with the changing nature
of intemet use and the increasing prevalence of internet use in our daily
lives. Just as lawmakers have reacted to the threats of cyber-stalking and
cyber-harassment by modifying existing legislation or drafting new
legislation, they should act similarly with the new threat of cyber-speech
for suicide promotion. The factors that made cyber-stalking particularly
problematic, including dangers accompanied with anonymity, wide
dissemination, instantaneous dissemination, and the narrowing of
proximity, are present in the use of the internet to promote suicide.
Because cyber-speech that promotes suicide does not fall neatly into
traditional categories of unprotected speech, legislators must pay careful
attention to what the proposed legislation intends to prohibit. A statute that
prohibits general information about suicide or suicide methods posted on
internet community boards or social networking sites may in fact violate
the First Amendment. However, a statute that prohibits intentionally and
knowingly providing information and methods for committing suicide
through interstate commerce to a specific recipient who has implicitly or
explicitly indicated a desire for such information, with the intent and
knowledge that the recipient uses that information to commit suicide, may
survive First Amendment scrutiny.

